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Abstract
Background: Co-infection of different influenza A viruses is known to occur but how viruses interact within
co-infection remains unknown. An outbreak in a college campus during the 2009 pandemic involved two subtypes
of influenza A: persons infected with pandemic A/H1N1; persons infected with seasonal A/H3N2 viruses; and
persons infected with both at the same time (co-infection). This provides data to analyse the possible interaction
between influenza A viruses within co-infection.
Methods: We extend a statistical inference method designed for outbreaks caused by one virus to that caused by
two viruses. The method uses knowledge of which subtype each case is infected with (and whether they were
co-infected), contact information and symptom onset date of each case in the influenza outbreak. We then apply it
to construct the most likely transmission tree during the outbreak in the college campus.
Results: Analysis of the constructed transmission tree shows that the simultaneous presence of the two influenza
viruses increases the infectivity and the transmissibility of A/H1N1 virus but whether it changes the infectivity of
A/H3N2 is unclear. The estimation also shows that co-transmission of both subtypes from co-infection is low and
therefore co-infection cannot be sustained on its own.
Conclusions: This study suggests that influenza A viruses within co-infected patients can interact in some ways
rather than transmit independently, and this can enhance the spread of influenza A virus infection.
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Background
Co-circulation of multiple types and subtypes of influ-
enza virus has been commonly observed in human
populations [1, 2]. With advanced molecular techniques
[3, 4], it is now becoming possible to rapidly detect differ-
ent subtypes or strains of a disease agent within infected
patients. There is accumulating evidence to show that the
phenomenon that multiple subtypes of influenza A virus
infect an individual simultaneously (i.e. co-infection) is
not as rare as we previously thought [5–10]. Hence it is
interesting to know how the simultaneous presence of two
strains alters, compared to singly infected individuals, the
transmissibility of each subtype and of both subtypes to-
gether. Some observations of transmission involved with
co-infected individuals have been reported [11, 12]. One
important observation reported is individuals co-infected
with pandemic A/H1N1 and seasonal A/H3N2 influenza
viruses within one outbreak at a college campus in Beijing,
China during the 2009 pandemic [12]. Liu et al. [12] pro-
vides direct evidence that individuals co-infected with dif-
ferent subtypes can transmit viruses separately or
simultaneously and provides detailed data for us to quan-
tify the interactions between virus strains. The transmis-
sion characteristics can be directly estimated from the
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transmission tree; however, the difficulty for constructing
the transmission tree is that some contacts were missed.
Fortunately, recent development in statistical inference
[13, 14] allows us to construct the transmission tree of a
single influenza A virus from such a partial contact net-
work. In this short report we extend this inference method
to construct the transmission tree that includes two influ-
enza A viruses and their co-infection. From the con-
structed tree we estimate the impact of co-infection on
transmission. We use two parameters to characterise the
impact: the co-transmission rate and an interaction par-
ameter. Here we define the former as the rate at which
two strains simultaneously transmit from doubly infected
individuals to susceptible individuals; and the latter as the
ratio of transmissibility of each single virus from co-
infected individuals to the transmissibility of each single
virus from singly infected individuals.
Data
Here we briefly summarize the data collection method
and data of Liu et al. [12]. Investigations were conducted
on all influenza like illness (ILI) cases identified during
the outbreak. Epidemiological, clinical and contact tra-
cing data were collected by interviewing patients and re-
trieving medical records. Viruses were identified by
reverse-transcription polymerase chain reaction assays
followed by sequence analysis. The heamagglutination
inhibition tests were used to detect antibodies to both
viruses. The outbreak is reported to have taken place
within three buildings (two dormitories and one college
clinic). No other cases at the college were reported.
Buildings 1 and 2 (with a total membership of 235 and
191 persons, respectively) are next to each other and
there is restricted access between the two and to the
wider community. Forty five ILI cases were reported
from 31 August to 10 September and forty (N = 40) had
laboratory-confirmed influenza A infection. Three differ-
ent types of infection were reported: 22 infected with
pandemic A/H1N1 virus, 12 infected with seasonal A/
H3N2 virus and six co-infected with both influenza A vi-
ruses. In their sequences no substantial differences were
observed between patients with mixed and single infec-
tions in either pandemic A/H1N1 or seasonal A/H3N2
virus. The clinical features were similar for patients with
different infections and the six co-infected patients
showed no more severe symptoms than the singly infected
patients. Contacts between infected people are shown in
Fig. 2 of Liu et al. [12] but this only extends to the contact
network within one dormitory. The ‘index’ case with pan-
demic influenza A/H1N1 infection was a college student
whose symptoms first occurred on 31 August, 2 days after
his returning to college. Except for the index case, all pa-
tients with A/H1N1 infection had not left the campus
during the previous week. In contrast, the source of
seasonal A/H3N2 virus infection cannot be determined
exactly although available data indicate that A/H3N2 virus
might have been prevailing in the college when the pan-
demic H1N1 virus was introduced. Before the isolation of
cases and the initiation of prophylaxis among the campus
population (5 September 2009), several patients visited the
college clinic and the mixing between students of different
dormitories was not frequent in comparison to the mixing
between students within each dormitory.
Methods
For a fully traced transmission tree (i.e., the information
of the infector v and time of symptom onset t are col-
lected), the infector v(i) for each case i (except the index
case) and the duration between symptom onset of case i
and symptom onset of its infector v(i): ti-tv(i) should be
known. From these it is straightforward to estimate the
generation interval distribution and transmissibility of
infection. In reality, however, it is rare and difficult to
record all the information. Based on the partially known
contact tracing data and dates of symptom onset, Hens
et al. [14] illustrated an inference method to reconstruct
the most likely transmission tree that involved with only
one virus. Here we further develop it to a transmission
tree during an outbreak that involves with two viruses of
similar epidemiological characteristics.
In general, a possible transmission tree can be de-
scribed by pij(v,w,φ;θ), the probability that case j is the
infector of case i, given the duration between symptom
onset of case i and case j, given the information on the
possible infector v and the known contacts w, and given
the types φ of infection of both cases. Following Hens et
al [14], its total log-likelihood is given by:





pij v;w;φ; θð Þ log g ti−tjjθ
  
ð1Þ
The sum runs through all the non-zero pij. Here g(Δt |θ)
denotes the probability density of the generation interval
distribution of influenza infection, with θ representing the
set of parameters that characterise the probability density
distribution. Different distributions such as gamma, log-
normal and Weibull can be used to describe the distribu-
tion of generation intervals [14]. Here we assume it follows
a Weibull distribution:










g Δtjθð Þ ¼ 0 otherwise:
ð2Þ
The distribution has two parameters (i.e., θ = {a, b}): scale
parameter a and shape parameter b, such that the mean is
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T = aΓ(1+ 1/b) and the variance is σ2 = a2[Γ(1+ 2/b)- Γ(1 +
1/b)2]. Here Γ() is the Gamma function.
Compared with outbreaks that involved one virus and
one transmission process [14], this outbreak [12] involved
two viruses and five possible transmission processes: from
A/H1N1 to A/H1N1; from A/H3N2 to A/H3N2; from co-
infection to A/H1N1; from co-infection to A/H3N2 and
from co-infection to co-infection. However, the data given
in Liu et al. [12] only provide the relevant information for
three transmission processes: from A/H1N1 to A/H1N1;
from co-infection to A/H1N1; and from co-infection to
co-infection. The simple calculations show that the mean
generation intervals (and their standard deviations) for the
three transmission processes are 1.8 (0.8), 1.2 (0.4), 1.6
(0.6) days, respectively. In this data there is no evidence
that they differ. As no data is available for the transmis-
sion processes that were involved with A/H3N2 [12], it is
difficult to estimate their generation intervals and judge
how they differ from those generation intervals involved
with pandemic A/H1N1. Nevertheless, a recent systematic
review [15] indicates that the generation interval of pan-
demic A/H1N1 virus was similar to that of the seasonal
flu. Further, as observed by Liu et al. [12], the three differ-
ent types of infections have similar epidemiological char-
acteristics. In view of these, the same generation interval
distribution is assumed for the three types of infection.
The probability that case i is infected by case j, pij, can
be calculated as the probability of observing the duration
between the symptom onsets in cases i and j, g(ti-tj|θ),
times the probability of a potentially infectious contact
between i and j, πij, normalized by the probability of i
being infected by any other case k:
pij v;w;φ; θð Þ ¼
πij v;w;φð Þg ti−tjjθ
 X
k≠i
πik v;w;φð Þg ti−tk jθð Þ
ð3Þ
The probability of a potentially infectious contact be-
tween i and j, πij, is based on the contact information
(v,w) collected during the outbreak and the types φ of
infection of both cases i and j. To distinguish different
types of infection and to reflect the fact that there is only
limited mixing between students in building 1 and build-
ing 2, we define the following,
ψij ¼ 1 if case i and case j reside in the same
dormitory and are the same type of infection or if
case j is a co−infection;
ψij ¼ w if case i and case j reside in different
dormitories and are the same type of infection or
if case j is a co−infection;
ψij ¼ 0 otherwise:
ð4Þ
The variable w defines the extent of contact rates be-
tween students in two dormitories in relation to contact
rates within dormitories: w = 0 implies that contacts be-
tween dormitories are forbidden and w = 1 suggests that
contacts between dormitories are the same as that
within each dormitory. Student access to the college
clinic was not restricted. The original numberings of pa-
tients in Fig. 2 of Liu et al. [12] are given in accordance
with the order of symptom onset within each building.
For the convenience of our analysis, the forty patients
have been re-indexed in the order of symptom onset as
1, 2, …, 40 (see Fig. 1). If cases i and j form a likely
transmission pair (i.e., v(i) = j) and there is only one pos-
sible infector, πij(v,w,φ) = ψij and pij(v,w,φ;θ) =1. If the
outbreak investigation reveals that case i is not the index
case and does not contact any of the i-1 cases that devel-
oped symptoms before case i, the probability of a poten-
tially infectious contact is πij(v,w,φ) = ψij/ηi-1 Here ηi-1 is
the ‘effective’ number of infections that developed
symptoms before case i and are of the same type of
infection as case i or co-infection, and is calculated
as ηi − 1 = ∑k = 1
i − 1ψik.
Given the contact information (v,w), the most likely
transmission tree can be obtained by finding the values
of parameters θ = {a, b} that maximize the total log-
likelihood (1). The downhill simplex method [16] was
used to locate the maximum-likelihood estimate (MLE),
θ^ , of the parameters. We also used the MCMC method
to sample the values of parameters θ and find their me-
dians, 2.5 percentile and 97.5 percentile.
From the probabilities that case i is infected by case j:
{p1i, …, pNi}, we can sample a transmission tree in which
all cases are connected and case 1 is the index case
(Fig. 1) and further estimate transmissibility. The case
reproduction number is the average number of second-
ary cases generated by primary cases, which measures
the transmissibility of infection. The overall case-
reproduction number on day t, Rt, can be estimated by









We can further estimate the infection type-specific re-
productive numbers when both case i and case j are of


























Here the symbol δij,TYPE is defined as: δij,TYPE =1 if
both cases i and j are of the infection TYPE; δij,TYPE = 0
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otherwise. To characterise the interaction between two
types of virus within co-infected individuals, we further
estimate the reproductive numbers of A/H1N1 and A/


















Here Δ ij,TYPE is defined as: Δ ij,TYPE =1 if infector case
j is co-infected while the infectee case i is singly infected
with type TYPE; otherwise Δ ij,TYPE =0. The strain inter-








Here ϕ1 measures the effect on infectivity of A/H1N1
within co-infections and ϕ2 measures the effect on in-
fectivity of A/H3N2 within co-infections.
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Fig. 1 One plausible transmission tree. The tree was constructed under the assumption of limited mixing rate between students in two
dormitories in relation to within building mixing rates (w = 25 %). In the construction, the other possible sources of seasonal A/H3N2 virus (e.g.,
the two question marked boxes above building 2 and clinic in Fig. 2 of Liu et al. [12]) have been ignored. The thick arrows represent
transmissions from Liu et al. [12] while the thin arrows display one of the most likely transmissions
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Ethics considerations
Data that were used in the analysis of this study were ex-
tracted from a previous study [12] and hence did not re-
quire Human Resource Ethics committee approval.
Results and discussion
The data shown in Fig. 2 of Liu et al. [12] indicates that
the index case is infected with pandemic A/H1N1 virus.
Among the six cases that the index case infects, three
patients (i.e., case 2, 5, and 15) are co-infected with both
A/H1N1 and A/H3N2. It was assumed that seasonal A/
H3N2 virus was endemic [12], however, the infectious
contacts with A/H3N2 of these three co-infected cases
were unknown. Several possible scenarios are possible:
cases 2, 5 and 15 were exposed to pandemic A/H1N1
virus when they were still infectious with A/H3N2; cases
2, 5 and 15 were further exposed to seasonal A/H3N2
virus soon after they had acquired pandemic A/H1N1
virus from the index case; the three cases were infected
simultaneously with both A/H1N1 and A/H3N2 viruses
from the index case who was actually co-infected before
contact with cases 2, 5 and 15 but was incorrectly typed
as a single infection with pandemic A/H1N1 virus. For
simplicity, we use all the contact information for cases
within building 1, especially the pathways from the index
case to the three co-infections, ignoring the possible
pathways for transmitting background endemic seasonal
A/H3N2 virus.
The maximum likelihood estimates of the infective
contact probabilities pij(v,w,φ;θ) are listed in Table 1
from which one sample transmission tree is shown in
Fig. 1. The MLEs of the generation interval distribution
g(Δt|θ) and the time course of the mean case reproduct-
ive number Rt are shown in Fig. 2. The generation inter-
val has a mean of 1.72 days and a standard deviation
(SD) of 0.74 days. The mean case reproductive number
over the whole outbreak is 1.57 with SD = 0.022. Before
the isolation of cases and the initiation of prophylaxis
among the campus population occurred (5 September
2009), the reproductive number is estimated to be 2.80
with SD = 0.016; after this it declines to 0.341 with SD =
0.047. This clearly shows the effectiveness of isolation
and prophylaxis.
To measure the interactions between two influenza A
viruses, we first estimated the values of infection type-
specific reproductive numbers before the initiation of
isolation and prophylaxis occurred. Because most trans-
missions that involve A/H1N1 and co-infections are
known, the estimates of the infection type-specific re-
productive numbers are stable at Re
1 = 1.44 and Re
C =
0.67, and the reproductive number of A/H1N1 due to
co-infection is Re,C
1 = 2.01. In contrast, transmissions that
involve A/H3N2 were missing and so estimates of their
reproductive numbers show some uncertainty: Re
2 has a
mean 0.48 and 95 % confidence interval of [0.45, 0.51],
and the reproductive number of A/H3N2 due to co-
infection is Re,C
2 = 1.60 [1.58, 1.62]. Although the esti-
mate of Re
1 for A/H1N1 is in agreement with the usual
estimates [15, 17], that of Re
2 for A/H3N2 is much
smaller than other estimates which range from 1.19 to
1.37 [17]. The likely reason for this difference lies in the
fact that pandemic A/H1N1 is a novel virus while A/
H3N2 is an endemic seasonal virus in the study region
[12] so some pre-existing immunity against A/H3N2
Fig. 2 Constructed transmission tree of influenza A virus: a The relative frequency of the generation intervals; b The average case reproduction
number Rt as it varies with time. Bars represent 95 % nonparametric bootstrap percentile confidence intervals generated from one million
possible transmission trees sampled from the contact probabilities listed in Table 1
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due to the previous infections and/or vaccination re-
duces its susceptibility and hence its spread. In the pres-
ence of co-infection, infectivity of A/H1N1 increases
moderately with ϕ1 = 1.4. However, the increased infect-
ivity of A/H3N2 in the presence of co-infection is large:
ϕ2 = 3.28 [95 % CI: 3.18 3.38] and so co-infection is es-
timated to contribute greatly to the outbreak. This is not
inconsistent with Liu et al. [12]’s observation that no
Table 1 The most likely contact probabilities under the limited
mixing between dormitories (w = 25 %)
Infectee i Infector j pij Infectee i Infector j pij
1 (1) – 35 (1) 16 (0) 1.0
2 (0) 1 (1)* 1.0 36 (1) 19 (1) 1.0
3 (1) 1 (1) 1.0 37 (2) 2 (0) 0.001602
4 (1) 1 (1) 1.0 37 (2) 5 (0) 0.001602
5 (0) 1 (1)* 1.0 37 (2) 11 (2) 0.08588
6 (1) 2 (0) 1.0 37 (2) 12 (2) 0.08588
7 (1) 2 (0) 1.0 37 (2) 13 (2) 0.08588
8 (1) 4 (1) 1.0 37 (2) 14 (2) 0.08588
9 (1) 5 (0) 1.0 37 (2) 15 (0) 0.08588
10 (1) 5 (0) 1.0 37 (2) 16 (0) 0.08588
11 (2) 2 (0) 0.5 37 (2) 21 (0) 0.08588
11 (2) 5 (0) 0.5 37 (2) 23 (2) 0.08588
12 (2) 2 (0) 0.5 37 (2) 24 (2) 0.08588
12 (2) 5 (0) 0.5 37 (2) 25 (2) 0.074625
13 (2) 2 (0) 0.5 37 (2) 26 (2) 0.074625
13 (2) 5 (0) 0.5 37 (2) 27 (0) 0.074625
14 (2) 2 (0) 0.5 38 (1) 1 (1) 3.67E-11
14 (2) 5 (0) 0.5 38 (1) 2 (0) 2.53E-05
15 (0) 1 (1)* 1.0 38 (1) 3 (1) 2.53E-05
16 (0) 2 (0) 1.0 38 (1) 4 (1) 2.53E-05
17 (1) 3 (1) 1.0 38 (1) 5 (0) 2.53E-05
18 (1) 3 (1) 1.0 38 (1) 6 (1) 0.001691
19 (1) 4 (1) 1.0 38 (1) 7 (1) 0.001691
20 (1) 5 (0) 1.0 38 (1) 8 (1) 0.001691
21 (0) 5 (0) 1.0 38 (1) 9 (1) 0.001691
22 (1) 1 (1) 1.0 38 (1) 10 (1) 0.001691
23 (2) 2 (0) 0.5 38 (1) 15 (0) 0.024945
23 (2) 5 (0) 0.5 38 (1) 16 (0) 0.024945
24 (2) 2 (0) 0.5 38 (1) 17 (1) 0.024945
24 (2) 5 (0) 0.5 38 (1) 18 (1) 0.024945
25 (2) 2 (0) 0.011463 38 (1) 19 (1) 0.024945
25 (2) 5 (0) 0.011463 38 (1) 20 (1) 0.024945
25 (2) 11 (2) 0.144752 38 (1) 21 (0) 0.024945
25 (2) 12 (2) 0.144752 38 (1) 22 (1) 0.024945
25 (2) 13 (2) 0.144752 38 (1) 27 (0) 0.090627
25 (2) 14 (2) 0.144752 38 (1) 28 (1) 0.090627
25 (2) 15 (0) 0.036188 38 (1) 29 (1) 0.090627
25 (2) 16 (0) 0.036188 38 (1) 30 (1) 0.090627
25 (2) 21 (0) 0.036188 38 (1) 31 (1) 0.090627
25 (2) 23 (2) 0.144752 38 (1) 32 (1) 0.090627
25 (2) 24 (2) 0.144752 38 (1) 33 (1) 0.090627
26 (2) 2 (0) 0.011463 38 (1) 35 (1) 0.07875
26 (2) 5 (0) 0.011463 38 (1) 36 (1) 0.07875
Table 1 The most likely contact probabilities under the limited
mixing between dormitories (w = 25 %) (Continued)
26 (2) 11 (2) 0.144752 39 (2) 2 (0) 1.70E-10
26 (2) 12 (2) 0.144752 39 (2) 5 (0) 1.70E-10
26 (2) 13 (2) 0.144752 39 (2) 11 (2) 0.00047
26 (2) 14 (2) 0.144752 39 (2) 12 (2) 0.00047
26 (2) 15 (0) 0.036188 39 (2) 13 (2) 0.00047
26 (2) 16 (0) 0.036188 39 (2) 14 (2) 0.00047
26 (2) 21 (0) 0.036188 39 (2) 15 (0) 0.000118
26 (2) 23 (2) 0.144752 39 (2) 16 (0) 0.000118
26 (2) 24 (2) 0.144752 39 (2) 21 (0) 0.000118
27 (0) 15 (0) 1.0 39 (2) 23 (2) 0.00047
28 (1) 15 (0) 0.5 39 (2) 24 (2) 0.00047
28 (1) 16 (0) 0.5 39 (2) 25 (2) 0.031389
29 (1) 16 (0) 0.5 39 (2) 26 (2) 0.031389
29 (1) 16 (0) 0.5 39 (2) 27 (2) 0.007847
30 (1) 19 (1) 1.0 39 (2) 34 (2) 0.4631
31 (1) 19 (1) 0.5 39 (2) 37 (2) 0.4631
31 (1) 20 (1) 0.5 40 (2) 2 (0) 8.39E-15
32 (1) 21 (0) 1.0 40 (2) 5 (0) 8.39E-15
33 (1) 21 (0) 1.0 40 (2) 11 (2) 8.98E-07
34 (2) 2 (0) 0.000535 40 (2) 12 (2) 8.98E-07
34 (2) 5 (0) 0.000535 40 (2) 13 (2) 8.98E-07
34 (2) 11 (2) 0.114752 40 (2) 14 (2) 8.98E-07
34 (2) 12 (2) 0.114752 40 (2) 15 (0) 2.24E-07
34 (2) 13 (2) 0.114752 40 (2) 16 (0) 2.24E-07
34 (2) 14 (2) 0.114752 40 (2) 21 (0) 2.24E-07
34 (2) 15 (0) 0.028688 40 (2) 23 (2) 8.98E-07
34 (2) 16 (0) 0.028688 40 (2) 24 (2) 8.98E-07
34 (2) 21 (0) 0.028688 40 (2) 25 (2) 0.000308
34 (2) 23 (2) 0.114752 40 (2) 26 (2) 0.000308
34 (2) 24 (2) 0.114752 40 (2) 27 (0) 7.71E-05
34 (2) 25 (2) 0.099713 40 (2) 34 (2) 0.020572
34 (2) 26 (2) 0.099713 40 (2) 37 (2) 0.020572
34 (2) 27 (0) 0.024928 40 (2) 39 (2) 0.958157
The numbers in the brackets are the type of infection: 0, 1, 2 representing
co-infection, infection with pandemic A/H1N1 virus alone and infection with
seasonal A/H3N2 virus alone, respectively. The three effective contacts from
the index pandemic A/H1N1 to co-infection that are marked with asterisk are
as given by Liu et al. [12]. The maximum likelihood estimates of Weibull distri-
bution parameters for the generation time are scale =1.93 and shape = 2.49
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patients had detectable hemagglutination inhibiting anti-
bodies against pandemic H1N1 virus in their acute-
phase samples . Although the presence of co-infection
can increase the infectivity of each component influenza
virus, co-infection itself cannot spread successfully be-
cause the co-transmissibility measured by Re
C is esti-
mated to be 0.67, which is less than one.
The above results are obtained under the assumption
of w = 25 %, which is used to reflect the observation al-
though there were activities outside the dormitory, the
members of the 2 buildings did not interact with each
other to any significant extent (p1361, second column,
Liu et al. [12]). If different values of w are chosen, the es-
timation of transmissibility involved with A/H3N2 virus
changes although the results of the overall transmissibility
and those involved with A/H1N1 remain nearly the same.
With a low value of w (i.e. the mixing between two dormi-
tories become more restrictive), the reproductive number
of A/H3N2 due to co-infection (Re,C
2 ) decreases while Re
2
increases; this consequently reduces the value of ϕ2. For
example, the estimate of ϕ2 becomes 3.00 [2.92, 3.13]
when w =0.1. This is the outcome because without the
index case of A/H3N2 infection, the only possible infec-
tors of A/H3N2 cases 11, 12, 13, 14 in building 2 are co-
infection cases 2 and 5, which is independent of the
limited mixing rate between two dormitories (w). In the
situation without limitation in mixing rates between two
dormitories (i.e., w = 1.0), the estimate of ϕ2 is 4.57 [4.42,
4.70]. This result implies that in the absence of any un-
identified index cases of A/H3N2 infection, co-infection
can enhance the transmissibility of each component virus.
However, all the cases reported in building 2 were in-
fections with A/H3N2 virus alone. In view of the re-
strictive mixing between two dormitories, it is likely that
there is an unknown index case of A/H3N2 infection
within building 2, although it was not reported. An ana-
lysis listed in the Additional file 1 shows that such a hid-
den index case could change the above conclusion: the
reproductive number of A/H3N2 due to co-infection
(Re,C
2 ) might not exceed the reproductive number by its
own (Re
2) and therefore co-infection could not enhance
the infectivity of A/H3N2. Jombart et al. [18] have devel-
oped a Bayesian method to reconstruct disease out-
breaks by combining epidemiological and genomic data.
This may allow for the tests of whether co-infection
cases in building 1 are the infectors of A/H3N2 cases in
building 2 or whether there is a hidden index case of A/
H3N2 infection in building 2. Unfortunately, the repre-
sentative sequences deposited in GenBank by Liu et al.
[12] were not complete genome sequences and were not
marked with the relevant symptom onset information.
Hence they cannot help to distinguish and/or find the
potential sources of A/H3N2 infection in the transmis-
sion tree. Conditional on the available information, the
evidence about how co-infection alters the infectivity of
A/H3N2 virus is lacking. Nevertheless, the conclusion
about enhanced infectivity of A/H1N1 within co-
infection is not affected.
The original method of reconstructing the transmis-
sion tree by Hens et al. [14] relies on three assumptions:
all cases are observed; all of them except the index case
are infected by another observed case; and the gener-
ation interval distribution remains unchanged. To apply
to such outbreaks as studied here involving two viruses,
some assumptions have been strengthened. There must
be two index cases that were singly infected with differ-
ent viruses or one index case that was co-infected with
the two viruses. There are more than one transmission
processes. In our study example, there are five transmis-
sion processes: A/H1N1 to A/H1N1; A/H3N2 to A/
H3N2; co-infection to A/H1N1; co-infection to A/H3N2
and co-infection to co-infection. Unfortunately the avail-
able data does not provide direct information for all the
transmission processes, and it is not directly possible to
assess the heterogeneity in generation intervals among
transmission processes. In view of the similar estimates
for generation intervals of different transmission pro-
cesses [15], the generation interval distribution has been
assumed to be unchanged over different types of infec-
tion as well as over the course of the outbreak.
Another aspect is how co-infection is generated. It
could be due to an infection with one virus becoming a
co-infection, or it could be a consequence of a co-
transmission. And it is possible that going from A/H1N1
to co-infection is easier than going from A/H3N2 to co-
infection, or vice versa. Though this is an interesting
issue [19] the limited information that we can collect
from Liu et al. [12] cannot allow us to detect the order
in which the two viruses are acquired by an co-infected
individual and therefore no way to investigate the effect
of the order in which the two viruses are acquired.
Conclusion
Reconstructing transmission trees provides useful infor-
mation about generation interval and transmission rate of
infectious diseases, which are important for designing
containment strategies. In this study, the method of
reconstructing the plausible transmission tree from the in-
complete data of an outbreak caused by one virus (Hens
et al. [14]) has been extended to the outbreak caused by
two influenza A viruses. Our estimates of epidemiological
characteristics such as the generation interval and the
transmission rate of influenza A virus are well within the
ranges estimated by others [15, 17]. Our estimation shows
that although co-infection with A/H1N1 and A/H3N2 vi-
ruses cannot be sustained by co-transmission, it enhances
the single transmission of both viruses. However, the con-
cluded enhancement of A/H3N2 virus infectivity within
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co-infection should be taken with caution owing to the
unknown infection source of seasonal H3N2 virus.
Cross-immunity, which characterises the interaction be-
tween different viruses when one virus re-infects individ-
uals recovered from previous infection with another virus,
has been well recognized and measured. Due to their rela-
tive rareness, co-infection and interactions between vi-
ruses within co-infections have not yet attracted the
attention they deserve. To our knowledge this is the first
analysis that estimates the interactions between influenza
A viruses within co-infection. Theoretical modelling illus-
trates their potential role in generating the recurrent epi-
demics and alternation of the dominant virus in seasonal
influenza [20, 21]. Surely this urges more empirical studies
to investigate this important issue of influenza and other
infectious diseases caused by multiple strains.
Additional file
Additional file 1: Effect of an (unidentified) index case of A/H3N2
infection in building 2. (DOCX 186 kb)
Abbreviations
ILI: influenza like illness; MLE: maximum likely estimate; SD: standard
deviation.
Competing interests
The authors declare that they have no competing interests.
Authors’ contributions
Conceived and designed the study: XSZ and DD; Performed the study: XSZ;
wrote the paper: XSZ and DD. Both authors read and approved the final
manuscript.
Acknowledgements
This research was funded by the Public Health England. The authors
gratefully acknowledge the assistance of Tom Nichols and also express
gratitude to Drs Niel Hens and Michael Worobey for their constructive and
helpful comments.
Author details
1Centre for Infectious Disease Surveillance and Control, Public Health
England, 61 Colindale Avenue, London NW9 5EQ, UK. 2Medical Research
Council Centre for Outbreak Analysis and Modelling, Department of
Infectious Disease Epidemiology, Imperial College School of Public Health,
Norfolk Place, London W2 1PG, UK. 3Medical Research Council Biostatistics
Unit, University Forvie Site, Robinson Way, Cambridge CB2 0SR, UK.
Received: 27 May 2015 Accepted: 22 January 2016
References
1. Denoeud L, Turbelin C, Ansart S, Valleron A-J, Flahault A, Carrat F. Predicting
pneumonia and influenza mortality from morbidity data. PLoS ONE. 2007;
2(5):e464. doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0000464.
2. Finkelman BS, Viboud C, Koelle K, Ferrari MJ, Bharti N, Grenfell BT. Global
patterns in seasonal activity of influenza A/H3N2, A/H1N1, and B from 1997
to 2005: viral coexistence and latitudinal gradients. PLoS ONE. 2007;12:
e1296. doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0001296.
3. Pajak B, Stefanska I, Lepek K, Donevski S, Romanowska M, Szeliga M, et al.
Rapid differentiation of mixed influenza A/H1N1 virus infections with
seasonal and pandemic variants by multitemperature single-stranded
conformational polymorphism analysis. J Clin Microbiol. 2011;49:2216–21.
4. Nie S, Roth RB, Stiles J, Mikhlina A, Lu X, Tang YW, et al. Evaluation of Alere I
influenza A & B for rapid detection of influenza A and B. J Clin Microbiol.
2014;52:3339–44.
5. Sonoguchi T, Naito H, Hara M, Takeuchi Y, Fukumi H. Cross-subtype protection
in humans during sequential, overlapping, and or concurrent epidemics
caused by H3N2 and H1N1 influenza-viruses. J Infect Dis. 1985;151:81–8.
6. Ghedin E, Fitch A, Boyne A, Griesemer S, DePasse J, Bera J, et al. Mixed
infection and the genesis of influenza virus diversity. J Virol. 2009;83:8832–42.
7. Perez DR, Sorrell E, Angel M, Ye J, Hickman D, Pena L et al. Fitness of
pandemic H1N1 and seasonal influenza A viruses during co-infection. PLoS
Current. 2009; doi:10.1371/currents.RRN1011.
8. Peacey M, Hall RJ, Sonnberg S. Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 and seasonal influenza
A(H1N1) co-infection, New Zealand, 2009. Emerg Infect Dis. 2010;16:1618–20.
9. Lee N, Chan PKS, Lam W, Szeto CC, Hui DS. Co-infection with pandemic
H1N1 and seasonal H3N2 influenza viruses. Ann Intern Med. 2010;152:618–9.
10. Myers UA, Kasper MA, Yasuda CY, Savuth C, Spiro DJ, Hallpin R, et al. Dual
infection of novel influenza viruses A/H1N1 and A/H3N2 in a cluster of
Cambodian patients. Am J Trop Mede Hyg. 2011;85:961–3.
11. Toda S, Okamoto R, Nishida T, Nakao T, Yoshikawa M, Suzuki E, et al. Isolation
of influenza A/H3 and B viruses from an influenza patient: confirmation of
co-infection by two influenza viruses. Jpn J Infect Dis. 2006;59:142–3.
12. Liu W, Li ZD, Tang F, Wei MT, Tong YG, Zhang L, et al. Mixed infections of
pandemic H1N1 and seasonal H3N2 viruses in 1 outbreak. Clin Infect Dis.
2010;50:1359–65.
13. Wallinga J, Teunis P. Different epidemic curves for severe acute respiratory
syndrome reveal similar impacts of control measures. Am J Epidemiol. 2004;
160(6):509–16.
14. Hens N, Calatayud L, Kurkela S, Tamme T, Wallinga J. Robust reconstruction
and analysis of outbreak data: influenza A(H1N1)v transmission in a school-
based population. Am J Epidemiol. 2012;176:196–203.
15. Boëlle P-Y, Ansart S, Cori A, Valleron A-J. Transmission parameters of the A/
H1N1 (2009) influenza virus pandemic: a review. Influenza Other Respi
Viruses. 2011;5:306–16.
16. Nelder JA, Mead R. A simplex method for function minimization. Comput J.
1965;7:308–13.
17. Biggerstaff M, Cauchemez S, Reed C, Gambhrir M, Fineli L. Estimates of the
reproduction number for seasonal, pandemic, and zoonotic influenza: a
systematic review of the literature. BMC Infect Dis. 2014;14:480.
18. Jombart T, Cori A, Didelot X, Cauchemez S, Fraser C, Ferguson N. Bayesian
Reconstruction of Disease Outbreaks by Combining Epidemiologic and
Genomic Data. PLoS Comput Biol. 2014;10(1):e1003457. doi:10.1371/journal.
pcbi.1003457.
19. Davis BM, Aiello AE, Dawid S, Rohani P, Shrestha S, Foxman B. Influenza and
community-acquired pneumonia interactions: the impact of order and time
of infection on population patterns. Am J Epidemiol. 2012;175:363–7.
20. Zhang X-S, Cao K-F. The impact of coinfections and their simultaneous
transmission on antigenic diversity and epidemic cycling of infectious
diseases. BioMed Res Intern. 2014; Article ID 375862. http://dx.doi.org/10.
1155/2014/375862.
21. Zhang X-S. Strain interactions as a mechanism for dominant strain
alternation and incidence oscillation in infectious diseases: seasonal
influenza as a case study. PLoS ONE. 2015;10(11):e0142170. doi:10.1371/
journalpone.0142170.
•  We accept pre-submission inquiries 
•  Our selector tool helps you to find the most relevant journal
•  We provide round the clock customer support 
•  Convenient online submission
•  Thorough peer review
•  Inclusion in PubMed and all major indexing services 
•  Maximum visibility for your research
Submit your manuscript at
www.biomedcentral.com/submit
Submit your next manuscript to BioMed Central 
and we will help you at every step:
Zhang and De Angelis BMC Infectious Diseases  (2016) 16:38 Page 8 of 8
